The (Latest) Health Care Reform Debacle: What Went Wrong, And What to Do Next

I've been following the politics of health care reform for nearly 30 years, and I have never seen anything so bizarre as what has unfolded in DC since Tuesday's special election in Massachusetts.

There has been so much dithering about what Senator #41 means to the future of health care reform in this Congress and forward, that I can't find anything new to say about it.

Except this:

By my own crude sense of measurement, I've participated in six attempts to reform the health insurance system at the local, state, and national levels (modesty and post-traumatic stress disorder prevent me from listing the specifics, but buy me a couple of beers and I'll spill everything). Most of them not only failed miserably, but did so in a way which rendered the environment "toxic" for years to come.

Most of the failures had a few things in common. One was hubris on the part of the principals, the type which says, "we know so much more about the issues than you do; trust us, and when we solve your problems you'll be so grateful."

The second was a kind of tone-deafness which comes from sharing the same foxhole with a few other embattled souls in a nasty fight. I recall listening to a pitch from a very senior corporate executive extolling the virtues of a certain merger. I asked him after his presentation if his company was prepared for the severe public backlash that would result from his proposal becoming public. His answer: "The only people we need to persuade are in the state capitol; we don't care whether the media like us or not."

The third was an attempt to use the complexity of the issue to fog up the real questions, and try to divert the public from the simple, basic question which any reform proposal must answer: What does this mean for my health plan?

I think this is an essential element of the latest meltdown: the proponents of "reform" have, for the past six months or so, walked a very thin and fragile line of credibility, and completely forgot that most people in America already have health coverage, and like what they have, though they are concerned about what might happen in the future. So when regular people with health insurance see big expansion of government programs, subsidies for a bunch of people who already have coverage, a bunch of new bureaucratic and regulatory structures, and truly craven deals with both industry groups and individual lawmakers, they asked themselves, "What does all this matter to my health plan?" And by and large, the answer was either straightforwardly "your costs will go up," or a much more common, and much less honest, "we're pretty sure your costs might not go up quite as fast as in the past, but of course we can't be sure."

People aren't dumb.

Conversely, the reform strategies which succeeded best were those which were best equipped to answer the "What's in it for me?" question. If you can keep people's focus on the benefit to them, and talk straight to them, it's possible to sell common-sense reforms.

I hope Our Friends In Congress and the White House take this to heart as they consider how to re-package and sell a more highly-targeted health insurance reform strategy. The strategy should be based on using existing structures and programs to solve some of the real problems in the private insurance market and in our public health plans.

There's plenty both parties agree upon. Curbing the most egregious practices of the health insurance industry is a natural place to start; it was the first chapter in both the House and Senate bills. And it's hard to envision even the most flint-hearted conservative objecting to the idea of prohibiting insurers from denying or cutting off health coverage for people who are sick. Most of the House and Senate insurance reforms make sense; only insurers will object to them. Without a mandate that everyone purchase their product, there's nothing in it for them. Too bad...

It's also become common knowledge that the small group and individual health insurance markets are highly dysfunctional: highly-concentrated, inefficient and expensive. Small businesses pay 18-20 percent more for health coverage than larger companies do for the same benefits. Most of that excess cost is attributable to the costs of marketing, selling, and underwriting small group business. 25 to 27 percent of small group health premiums consist of administrative costs; for self-employed individuals, up to 40 percent of premium costs are administrative.

The small group market would benefit from a push for administrative efficiency in the health insurance market, especially through strategies which enable small businesses and self-employed individuals to take advantage of the laws of large numbers in shopping for and purchasing health coverage. Both the House and Senate agree on the potential value of insurance exchanges to encourage competition and administrative efficiency in the small group and individual health markets. There is disagreement only over whether an exchange strategy should be national or state-by-state in its scope.

In the spirit of practicality, I'd suggest we start with a series of federal grants to states which wish to establish either public or private non-profit insurance exchanges. They can be set up quickly, within three years, and have a reasonably good chance of impacting markets at the regional and local levels. Let them collaborate, share services, and merge if they want to. The most important thing is to use consolidated marketing, selling, purchasing and administration to put just a little more power into the small group customers' hands.

It's also generally agreed upon that the best way to reach the truly most vulnerable Americans is through an expansion of Medicaid. The House and Senate versions disagree merely as to the matter of degree of the expansion.

Finally, a wild card: giving Medicare the right to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies would probably enable Medicare to fill in a lot of the "doughnut hole" without a massive new subsidy.

All these measures would enable proponents to say quite clearly how health care reform will benefit them. All are based on expansions or refinements of ideas on which there is broad agreement.

The results wouldn't be perfect, but they should help our admittedly imperfect health care system to operate a little better, and make health care coverage a little more accessible and affordable.

Give these reforms five years to work. Once we can be assured that just about everyone who wants to obtain health coverage is able to do so, we may need new policy, such as a national mandate or a nationwide exchange, to fill in remaining market gaps.

I think this sort of package also has the benefit of being able to attract either enough bi-partisan support to pass easily, or enough ire toward Republicans who would be seen as obstructing the enactment of even a modest package of common-sense reforms, that it would give the White House the victory it needs.

But I'm not a Washington insider; I'm just a guy from the grass roots of America.